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RETHINKING INTERVENTION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
CARL TOBIAS*
Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm
(Environmental Paradigm) substantially enhances understanding of
intervention in federal environmental disputes.1 These controversies are a
critical type of modern civil lawsuit and perhaps constitute the quintessential
form of public law litigation. Professor Peter Appel comprehensively reviews
the lengthy history of the intervention mechanism, scrutinizes the substantial
1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, and closely examines
the phenomenon of public law litigation and intervention in it.
Professor Appel finds that federal district court judges liberally grant
requests to intervene in these cases, although he asserts that some legal
scholars have criticized trial judges for narrowly applying intervention in
environmental cases and for underestimating the contributions that
intervention applicants can make to resolution of these lawsuits.2 Professor
Appel’s observations lead him to suggest that appellate and district courts
rethink intervention in environmental litigation. Professor Appel urges that
the courts of appeals, which now review district court intervention decisions
de novo, instead use an abuse of discretion standard.3 Moreover, he suggests
that district judges depart from trans-substantive application of Rule 24 and
employ amicus curiae involvement as a substitute for intervention of right.4
Professor Appel, thus, significantly advances the dialogue about public
law cases and intervention in them and much that he states is undisputed.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of his article are controversial; therefore,
Environmental Paradigm warrants a response. This piece undertakes that
effort. I essentially afford a friendly critique, which emphasizes several
important ways that Professor Appel and I differ and suggests how Professor
Appel’s helpful analysis might be elaborated. My thesis is that we need a
better understanding of the history, theory, policy, and practice of
environmental litigation and of intervention in it. Until our comprehension of
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish
to thank Annette Appell, Jay Bybee, Chris Bryant, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Angela Dufva for processing this piece and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support.
Errors that remain are mine.
1. Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215 (2000).
2. See id. at n.10. I am one of those scholars.
3. See id. at nn.438-41 and accompanying text.
4. See id. at nn. 449-60 and accompanying text.
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these matters is more refined, it will remain difficult to articulate with
confidence the best prescriptions for the issues raised by intervention.
I. EMPIRICAL DATA ON ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND
INTERVENTION
First, and perhaps foremost, we need to improve understanding of modern
environmental litigation and of the role of intervention in it. Judges,
attorneys, and legal scholars participate in too much speculation premised on
anecdotes and impressions as well as reliance on appellate and district court
intervention decisionmaking in environmental cases which have appeared in
federal reporters or are available online. For example, Professor Appel
apparently assumes that intervention is granted too freely and that successful
applicants consume more time than is warranted,5 while other federal court
observers, including me, presume that intervention decisionmaking is overly
restrictive and that those permitted to intervene will make substantial
contributions.6 The truth probably lies somewhere in between.
Systematically collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing empirical data is
critical when considering the institution of changes as fundamental as those
suggested by Professor Appel.7 It is also important to realize that certain
aspects of this analysis will defy precise empirical verification. At some
juncture, the inquiry will devolve into value judgments and even speculation.
For instance, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the value of the
contributions that an applicant denied intervention might have made,
particularly identifying cause-effect linkages between the input foregone and
substantive judicial decisionmaking. Similar problems attend efforts to
determine how much applicants granted intervention delay dispute resolution
and improve judicial decisionmaking.8
Some of this information may be readily available because it already
exists in the information systems of the Federal Judicial Center, the
5. See id. at text accompanying n.426.
6. See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jones, Problems and Prospects of Participation in Affirmative
Action Litigation: A Role for Intervenors, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 221 (1980); Carl Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989); see also Appel,
supra note 1, at n.10.
7. For articulation of this idea in a related context, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation
of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989);
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
455, 455-59 (1993).
8. It is also important to recognize that delay attributable to helpful intervenor contributions
should not be considered detrimental. For more discussion of these ideas, see Carl Tobias, Standing to
Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 446-53.
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts, or specific appellate or
district courts. More, and ostensibly better, material probably exists in the
case files of individual environmental lawsuits. It might be useful to
assemble this material, especially the information collected from appellate or
district courts. For example, evaluators could compare appeals in circuits
which apply the de novo and the abuse of discretion standards. Assessors
might also consult cases in districts with diverse or representative dockets.
More specifically, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia should receive consideration because it hears so many appeals
from administrative agency decisions involving the environment, while
individual districts in the West may warrant analysis, as those courts resolve
numerous cases implicating public lands, natural resources, and endangered
species.
II. APPRECIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
We need a more refined understanding of modern environmental
litigation, particularly comprehension that is differentiated rather than
monolithic. Professor Appel does describe numerous types of environmental
lawsuits, although Environmental Paradigm appears to treat these actions as
if they were comparatively similar.
There is much difference between an appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of a regulation promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency in an Administrative Procedure Act
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding that involves the Clean Air Act
and an appeal to a federal district court of a Forest Service decision
authorizing a timber sale on a specific national forest. However, these are
simply examples of the kinds of lawsuits that can arise at the polar extremes
of environmental litigation, which ranges across a very broad spectrum.
Factors which may affect the litigation include the substantive basis of the
case, the party structure, the underlying substantive and procedural decisions
that are at issue, and the interests implicated by the litigation. More
specifically, is the litigation premised on the Constitution or a statute? If it is
based on legislation, what is the statutory purpose: pollution control,
environmental or species protection, or public lands preservation? Who are
the parties and the intervention applicants; what is the nature of the interest
which they seek to vindicate, and how does that interest implicate relevant
statutes? Is plaintiff, defendant, or the intervention applicant a governmental
agency, a private individual or entity, or a “public interest litigant?” Does the
appeal arise from an agency rulemaking, adjudicatory proceeding, or related
governmental action or inaction or involve private activity? In short, we need
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an understanding of environmental litigation that is at once broader and more
refined, and an appreciation that this form of modern lawsuit is not
monolithic.9
In most situations, the touchstone of analysis will be the purpose of the
environmental statute which underlies the litigation, and how this purpose
relates to the interest requirement for intervention. The statutory purpose is
the modern-day equivalent of the claim to private property which most easily
satisfied the original Federal Rule 24. Congress generally intends
environmental legislation to protect the environment from injury or to
preserve certain environmental values, although some statutes, especially
those prescribing pollution control, recognize that the interest in protecting
the environment is to be balanced with the usually economic interests of the
individuals and entities that the environmental regulation or protection
directly affects. Ascertaining these statutory purposes requires careful
scrutiny of the language and the applicable legislative history to discern
congressional intent.
III. A WORD ABOUT PRESCRIPTIONS
Assuming for the purpose of argument that Environmental Paradigm
affords an accurate descriptive account of intervention in modern
environmental cases, the article’s prescriptions warrant evaluation. Even if
Professor Appel correctly surmises that appellate courts review district court
intervention decisionmaking too rigorously, trial judges grant intervention
too liberally, and interests permitted to intervene impose substantial burdens
on parties and courts, particularly vis-à-vis their contributions,10 his proposals
deserve analysis.
Environmental Paradigm recommends that appellate courts, which now
employ de novo review of trial court intervention decisionmaking, substitute
abuse of discretion review.11 The article invokes Judge Henry Friendly’s
admonition in Hooker Chemicals that appeals court judges defer to district
judges who have the “feel of the case.”12 Questioning the preeminent
appellate judge of a generation is always treacherous.13 However, this view
9. For general examples of the specific type of analysis that I am suggesting, see Tobias, supra
note 6, at 279-83; Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 745, 754-57 (1987).
10. See Appel, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.449-60.
11. See id. at nn.438-41 and accompanying text.
12. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F. 2d 968, 991 (2d Cir. 1984); see also
Appel, supra note 1, at n.443 and accompanying text.
13. See Paul Freund, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1720 (1986); see
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/5
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vests substantial authority in a single decisionmaker, who may already be
overburdened by an enormous caseload and who may be considering the
petition of an applicant that is politically unpopular, has scarce resources, or
apparently promises to complicate or prolong already complex or lengthy
litigation.14 The abuse of discretion standard, thus, may simply place too
much trust in the discretion of one individual decisionmaker.
Professor Appel also suggests that district courts apply a non-trans-
substantive approach to Rule 24.15 The history of the provision’s 1966
amendment and of subsequent passage of major environmental statutes can
support this position,16 while Judge Friendly trenchantly stated that the
Rule’s intervention requirements must be read “in the context of the
particular statutory scheme that is the basis for the litigation.17 For example,
judges could consider the congressional purposes in adopting the substantive
legislation that underlies the litigation when resolving intervention requests.
If courts follow this approach, they may well grant intervention more
liberally than in the past because many intervention applicants arguably seek
participation to vindicate the statutory purposes, which generally relate to
protection of the environment.
Environmental Paradigm also proposes that district judges employ
amicus curiae involvement as a substitute for intervention of right.18 This
approach seems inadvisable for several reasons. First, the successful
intervention applicant enjoys party status, which bestows rights, such as the
ability to participate in discovery and to cross-examine witnesses, which an
amicus does not.19 Amici have traditionally contributed input to the appellate
process on legal issues, rather than factual ones.20 Some modern
environmental litigation involves only legal questions, but more of these
cases implicate factual disputes and a number are fact-intensive. The
also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
14. For discussion of these ideas in a related context, see Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Right
Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89)
15. See Appel, supra note 1, at n.448 and accompanying text; see also Robert M. Cover, For
James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
16. The 1966 revision’s drafting was essentially concluded in 1962, before the passage of every
major modern environmental statute. The drafters evinced contemporaneous appreciation of civil
rights litigation, however, and intimated that they wrote the revision with this form of public law
litigation in mind while apparently contemplating that judges would flexibly and pragmatically apply
the new provision to facilitate these cases. See Tobias, supra note 8, at 430-431.
17. Hooker Chemicals, 749 F.2d at 983.
18. See Appel, supra note 1, at nn.449-60 and accompanying text.
19. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) with FED. R. APP. P. 29. See generally 9A C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROC. § 3975 (1999).
20. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19. But see STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 110-11 (2d ed. 1984).
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comparatively limited experience with amicus participation in trial court
litigation may also mean that its use is not well understood in this context.
For instance, it remains unclear how much attention, if any, district judges
accord the input of amici.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AS PARADIGMATIC PUBLIC LAW
LITIGATION
Despite Professor Appel’s careful treatment of environmental litigation
and of intervention in it and notwithstanding his article’s title, Environmental
Paradigm clings too substantially to a private law view of environmental
litigation and participation in it. As the twenty-first century opens, it is
simply too late in the day to consider environmental cases as bipolar disputes
between two private parties or to emphasize the speed with which courts
resolve cases and the litigation expenses that intervenors impose on parties.21
Many factors compel a more public perception of environmental litigation.
Plaintiffs typically base these lawsuits on federal statutes, which are intended
to protect the environment and they seek to vindicate important interests that
affect the public. Moreover, the Advisory Committee, in drafting the 1966
revision of Rule 24, intended to depart from the view that private property
could best satisfy the interest requirement in the provision.22 The Committee
intended judges to apply the intervention device flexibly and pragmatically
and evinced some cognizance of public law litigation and of intervention in
it. Subsequent congressional passage of environmental statutes whose
principal purpose was to protect the environment and on which
environmental litigation is premised further reinforces this public law
perspective on the litigation and intervention in it.
CONCLUSION
Environmental Paradigm substantially improves comprehension of public
law litigation and intervention in environmental disputes. Certain aspects of
Professor Appel’s analysis are controversial or warrant elaboration, however.
Supplementation of his valuable contribution would advance understanding
of this critical form of modern public law litigation and of the valuable
intervention device.
21. For helpful articulation of these ideas, see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
22. I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 8, at 430-31.
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